Talks need to be pursued to reach an agreement on constitutional and electoral reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and elections should take place as scheduled regardless of the outcome of the talks, according to a document prepared by the European External Action Service as a basis for a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels on 21 February, state agency Hina said.

The discussion paper, seen by Hina, says that a successful electoral and constitutional reform would be a powerful political signal that would allow the next elections to be held in line with EU and international standards and would improve the functionality of the Bosniak-Croat Federation entity.

“The success of this reform hinges upon finding a balanced package, in line with EU standards, which reflects the concerns of all the parties to reach the required two thirds majority support in the Parliament,” the document says.

The package should include amendments to the election law to improve electoral standards (transparency and integrity) in line with recommendations from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO).

It should include amendments to the Constitution to comply with the European Court of Human Rights rulings and ensure equal representation to all citizens in the country in line with Venice Commission recommendations.

It should also include a review of the election modalities of the Presidency, and improvements to the functionality of the Federation entity to prevent further blockages.

The document makes no mention of the constituent peoples and legitimate representation of the constituent peoples, on which the Croats insist.

“The EU/US-facilitated talks in January in Neum allowed to achieve important progress on all these elements. Discussions need to be pursued to reach an agreement ahead of the October general elections.”

The document outlines three scenarios, depending on the outcome of the talks. The most positive scenario envisages an agreement on reforms and elections held in line with the new electoral framework. In a second scenario, if no agreement is reached, “local actors could attempt to prevent the elections from taking place, e.g. by blocking the necessary funding.” A third scenario foresees further escalation of demands, with possible boycott of the elections and/or contestation of results, and increasing dysfunctionality of the Federation.

“Political disagreements between ruling coalition partners have crystallised around constitutional and electoral reform, with divergent views over what the reform should include. Some parties are already announcing they consider boycotting or obstructing the next election or the implementation of its results, if no agreement is found on the reform, something which could lead to a further escalation of the political crisis,” the discussion paper says.

It says that continued high level engagement is needed to facilitate an agreement on the reform package.

“Active involvement of EU actors (HRVP, EUSR, Commission, EU Member States and the European Parliament) will be necessary, also to reiterate that the 2022 elections need to take place as scheduled, irrespective of the reforms outcome,” the discussion paper says.

The document mentions the possibility of sanctions if Republika Srpska’s announcements of the unilateral takeover of competences from the state become operational. Those sanctions may include an asset freeze and travel bans for natural and legal persons.

It says that Bosnia and Herzegovina “is facing one of the deepest political crises since the end of the armed conflict in 1995. The crisis jeopardises the stability and security of the country – and of the region – and at the same time seriously undermines the country’s EU perspective”.

“It puts to test the EU’s role as a geopolitical actor, its ability to shape its continent around its values and standards, and preserve its immediate neighbourhood from opposing external influences,” the paper reads.

It says that the involvement of third, non-EU, countries is growing.

“Serbia and Turkey are engaging at high level to normalise the situation. Others are exploiting existing divisions to undermine reform efforts and the country’s EU perspective. There is a considerable risk that destabilising activities through Republika Srpska entity might intensify if the overall geopolitical situation further deteriorates,” the document says.

“Such negative influences also spilled over into multilateral settings in 2021,” it adds, citing as an example the joint Russian/Chinese draft UNSC resolution on the Office of the High Representative (OHR), with threats to veto the renewal of EUFOR Althea’s executive mandate.

“The political crisis is already having an impact on the ability of BiH to fully benefit from EU financial assistance under IPA-IlI and the Economic and Investment Plan, as necessary countrywide sectoral strategies are not in place,” the paper underscores.

It goes on to say that “if the overall political situation does not improve in the short term, the EU could decide to use its financial assistance as leverage”.

“This should be supported by a clear narrative and clear signalling in advance, in order to offer an effective incentive for a change of behaviour, as well as reinforced outreach to all citizens in BiH. Such an approach should particularly avoid a) punishing those not responsible for the situation in BiH (i.e. citizens) and b) disrupting funding allowing BiH to move forward on EU-linked reforms,” the document says.

It notes that “there is no willingness to promote reconciliation. Instead, leaders continue to engage in historical revisionism, including genocide denial and glorification of war criminals”.

“The weaknesses and dysfunctionality of the Federation entity is providing additional arguments for secessionist discourses of the Republika Srpska (RS) leadership,” the document reads.

“Tensions increased in July 2021, following the decision of the former High Representative (HR) Inzko to enact a law criminalising the denial of genocide and glorification of war criminals. In reaction, RS-based parties have been united in boycotting State-level decision-making bodies (Presidency, Council of Ministers and Parliament), thereby blocking their functioning. Polarisation rose further when the new HR Schmidt took office in August, with the steady refusal of all RS-based parties to recognise his role and mandate,” the document says.

“In October 2021, the crisis took another worrying turn when the leader of the ruling party in RS Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) – announced an initiative to return to ‘original Dayton’, roll back reforms – with no legal basis – and withdraw from State-level agencies and repatriate competences to entity level, including on taxation, judiciary, investigative police and the army.”